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Otmar Issing 
As the crisis in financial markets has deepened, spreads between the government 
bonds of different countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU) have widened 
dramatically. In February, the spreads of secondary market yields of government 
bonds with maturities of close to ten years with respect to Germany were 141 basis 
points for Italy, 257 for Greece and 252 for Ireland, although back in 2000 these 
spreads had only amounted to 32, 84, and 25 basis points, respectively. 
With the start of EMU, long-term interest rates in participating countries had more 
or less converged to the lowest level before the introduction of the euro in 
countries like France. Germany or the Netherlands. Italy and Greece, meanwhile, 
had enjoyed a decline in the cost of servicing their public debt in comparison to 
pre-EMU days which showed that they were drawing enormous benefit from their 
participation in the European Monetary Union. It was the judgement of market 
participants that the introduction of the euro as a common currency meant that 
not only the currency risk had disappeared i.e. the risk of devaluation; all eurozone 
members were seen as belonging to a zone of stability that clearly spanned not 
only monetary stability, but also through observance of the disciplines of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal stability too.  
Spreads, meaning the difference in eurozone countries’ long-term interest rates, 
normally moved around a low level of around 25 basis points, a difference that 
mainly reflected such technical factors as liquidity in the markets. And this was the 
situation that basically prevailed for many years, despite less favourable 
developments in fiscal policy in some eurozone countries.  
 
 
But with the advent of the present crisis, all this changed rapidly. Countries with 
dramatically rising budget deficits like Ireland, along with high levels of public debt 
like Greece and Italy now have to pay substantially higher interest rates on 
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government bonds. Investors who are becoming much more risk averse in these 
times of crisis demanded higher credit risk premia for buying bonds from those 
countries that were seen as weak debtors. By contrast, long-term interest rates in 
those countries that were seen as in a better fiscal position, like France, Germany 
or Finland, enjoyed very low rates as a consequence of investors’ “flight to 
quality”.  
The increase in long-term interest rates hit those countries hardest that had 
already experienced a strong deterioration in their current or expected fiscal 
position. Concerns about the sustainability of public finances came to the fore, and 
the argument was even raised that a country might have to consider leaving the 
monetary union if this process were to continue – it’s a threat, incidentally, that 
totally lacks substance because it would be the surest way to commit economic 
suicide. But it therefore came as no surprise that the idea of a common European 
bond should be proposed as a means of mitigating the impact of the crisis and of 
countering the problem of rising interest rate spreads in eurozone countries that 
are the most vulnerable to these developments. In fact, the notion of a common 
bond had been put forward some years before, although at that time the main 
argument was that a common bond would result in higher liquidity than that 
created by the issuing of different national bonds. 
In the context of today, the liquidity argument is generally seen as being much less 
important. The main argument now is reducing the risk premia to be paid by 
creditors with lower fiscal credibility in the markets. Obviously, though, this could 
only be achieved by implicit or explicit guarantees from eurozone countries with 
sound public finances. A “true” multi-country European bond would have to 
comprise a full joint guarantee in which every participating country guarantees the 
full bond issued.  
Supporters of the European bond idea argue that this would mean that the 
“strongest” guarantee for the “weakest”, and ask whether this isn’t exactly what 
Europeans mean when they talk of solidarity?  
A common bond, by virtue of its construction, would delete the interest rate 
spread between bonds issued by different eurozone countries, so the question that 
has to be addressed is what effect the common issuance would have on the level of 
the interest rate, and more importantly on future fiscal policy and the euro itself.  
A common eurozone bond would certainly imply that countries like France and 
Germany would have to pay higher interest rates, and that would in the end mean 
higher tax burdens for their citizens. It’s also important to point out that once the 
markets expect substantial amounts of the common bond to be issued, interest 
rates on the huge stock of existing – purely national – bonds of solid countries 
would in the course of time be very likely to increase substantially. No one can 
possibly know in advance exactly how big this “bill” would be, and in any case 
arguing about billions of euros – important as that is – misses the crucial point; 3 
issuing a common bond would be a first step on the slippery road to “bail-outs”, 
and thus the end of the euro area as a zone of stability. 
The immediate trigger and the root cause of rising spreads were financial markets' 
growing concerns about the solidity of some eurozone countries. This loss of 
credibility has been a consequence of dramatic deteriorations in their current and 
expected fiscal positions. But, a common b o n d  i s  n o  c u r e  f o r  a  l a c k  o f  f i s c a l  
discipline; on the contrary, it would tend to encourage countries to continue on 
their wrong fiscal course. 
The global financial crisis was created not least by the excessive risk-taking of 
institutions that were being supported in their irresponsibility by the implicit “too 
big to fail” guarantees of their governments. Should the present crisis lead 
governments in Europe to create similar guarantees that “sovereign debtors are 
impossible-to-default”, the consequences would be probably even more damaging. 
So-called solidarity via common European bonds would perhaps in the short-term 
increase the re-election chances of those governments that created the fiscal mess 
– a situation that would be ironically similar to the large short-term bonuses paid to 
bankers who took excessive risks – as the costs of this “support” would have to be 
borne by the citizens of other countries. It would be hard to find a clearer case of a 
free riding. And the argument that some countries are in such a terrible situation 
that they will be unable to get out without substantial help from their neighbours is 
also unconvincing; in the end, that would turn against a common bond.  
The only workable cure for the eurozone’s ills is a credible commitment by all its 
members to reform and fiscal solidity. That’s what would overcome investors’ 
doubts and lead to the shrinking of the bond spreads. 
A common bond would be no more than a placebo for a “weak” country, but it 
would also be harmful because it would foster the illusion that it is possible for a 
country to get out of difficulty without having undertaken fundamental reforms. 
And in fact the opposite holds true; times of crises give governments the best 
argument to take tough measures needed to get the country back on a sustainable 
path. 
A common bond would be very costly for the more solid countries, but most 
dangerously of all, it would undermine the credibility of the eurozone as an area of 
stability and fiscal soundness. The major success achieved at the start of monetary 
union, when long-term interest rates in all countries converged to the level of the 
most stable members, would be spoiled. And the sanctions of negative financial 
markets reactions would mean that a high price had to be paid by all of the 
eurozone’s countries. 
In short, the “medicine” of a common eurozone bond would not cure the problems 
of its weakest members, but would instead prolong their reliance on budget 
deficits while encouraging them to hope for the de facto “bail-out” that is waiting 
just around the corner. 4 
The biggest threat of all would come from the political repercussions of such a 
move. Any policy that involves a price to be paid by those countries that have 
opted for fiscal solidity in favour of those with high deficits and continuing high 
debt levels would strongly undermine the stability status of the eurozone, and thus 
the confidence of its citizens. “Solidarity” in the true sense means that all of the 
countries concerned should comply with the fundamental rules of EMU by observing 
the disciplines of the Stability and Growth Pact and the “no bail-outs” principle. 
Fulfilling commitments that have been so solemnly undertaken is a core part of 
this, and those countries that may be tempted to undermine these principles would 
be demonstrating their own lack of solidarity. 
 